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Abstract 
The demographic structure of Egypt has the form of a pyramid, indicating that labour 
supply will grow at a relatively high rate for many years to come. Unless emigration flows 
will rise, Egypt needs to create jobs at a much higher pace than most other countries 
around the globe to absorb the new entrants at the domestic labour market. Adding to this 
is the currently high share of 30-40% of the Egyptian employees working in the rather 
inefficient public sector. In order to quantify future developments at the labour market, 
this paper presents a labour supply model to analyze the impact of the ongoing 
demographic supply shocks and the shedding of public sector jobs on unemployment in 
Egypt. The findings indicate that the demographic labour supply will increase 
unemployment in the short term as the Egyptian labour market will not be able to absorb 
the demographic labour supply, unless the Egyptian economy grows steadily at least at 5% 
for many years in a row. In the long term, the employment dividend can be reaped by 
productivity growth increases if the labour market starts functioning. The findings also 
point out that, for growth to accelerate rapidly, job creation should occur in the private 
and not in the public sector. The large public sector has been driving up government 
expenditures disproportionably, not only because of the existence of the high number of 
people employed in the public sector but also because of excessive public wage increases. 
 
Keywords: Demographics, labour supply, employment, greening, public sector 
employment, public finance.  
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Demographic pressure, excess labour supply and public-private sector employment in Egypt Page 2 
 
CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 3 
2. LITERATURE, BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION FOR THE MODEL USE ............... 4 
3. STYLISED FACTS OF LABOUR SUPPLY AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR 
EMPLOYMENT .................................................................................................................................... 7 
4. A LABOUR SUPPLY MODEL FOR THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY ................................... 13 
4.I. LABOUR SUPPLY MODEL SPECIFICATION ................................................................................................................ 14 
4.II. CALIBRATED AND ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES AND OTHER PARAMETERS ......................................................................... 18 
4.III. SCENARIO A – THE IMPACT OF POSITIVE LABOUR SUPPLY SHOCKS IN 2011-2030 ....................................................... 20 
4.IV. SCENARIO B – THE IMPACT OF SUSTAINED POSITIVE DEMAND SHOCKS IN 2011-20..................................................... 21 
4.V.OTHER SCENARIOS ........................................................................................................................................... 22 
4.VI. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES WITH VARYING ASSUMPTIONS AND SHOCK SIZES ..................................................................... 24 
5. POLICY REFLECTIONS .......................................................................................................... 26 
6. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS ................... 28 
References ................................................................................................................................................... 30 
Appendix on data sources and variables used in the analyses .................................................................... 33 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURES 
Figure 1 Age structure of the population of Egypt 
Figure 2 Youth dependency rates of Egypt in comparison with G-20 countries 
Figure 3 Projected growth rates of the working age population for Egypt 
Figure 4 Unemployment and public spending on public employment in Egypt 
Figure 5 Public and private sector employment in Egypt 
Figure 6 Transmission of a positive labour supply shock 
Figure 7 Simulation effects in response to supply shocks of 1.75% in 2011-30 
Figure 8 Simulation effects in response to positive demand shocks in 2011-20 
Figure 9 Simulation effects in response to decreases in public employment in 2011-30 
Figure 10 Simulation effects of market wages reacting to unemployment and 
productivity 
Figure 11 Simulated effects of GDP per capita at different GDP growth rates 
 
 
 
TABLES 
Table 1  Estimated and calibrated parameters of the labour supply model 
Table 2  Simulation effects under varying assumptions and shock sizes 
  
Demographic pressure, excess labour supply and public-private sector employment in Egypt Page 3 
 
Modelling in different styles will be appropriate for different purposes or different 
stages in the development of an area of economics 
Christopher A. Sims, 1989 
1. Introduction  
 
Egypt is an emerging economy that was rapidly growing in the years before the global 
crisis. It has a diversified economic activity, geographic strategic position and educated 
young and broad labour force makes it a high potential economy. While many developed 
economies around the globe struggle with increasing public expenditures due to an 
aging population, and a shrinking and aging labour force, the Egyptian economy shows 
another picture. Its population is young and numerous. For the decades to come the 
inflow of youngsters at the labour market will be high and the absorption at the labour 
market of these entrants is one of the main challenges for the Egyptian authorities. 
Therefore, sufficient job creation is crucial in the short and medium run in order to offer 
the young population prospects: a salary to live on, social security and career 
opportunities.  
 
In this respect, the public sector labour market also deserves attention. In Egypt, as in 
most developing economies, this sector is large and its functioning is different from that 
of the private sector labour market. Public sector labour markets are often more 
inefficient and dominant. Its dominance can influence the wage setting and other 
employment practices in the rest of the labour market. Moreover, its dominance can also 
hamper developments in the private sector, where job creation will primarily have to 
take place. In this light, the developments of the fiscal costs of the employment in the 
government sectors across countries are an interesting angle to study public sector 
employment (see also Tansel on the case of Turkey, 2005, or Christofides and Pashardes, 
2002, on Cyprus). 
 
This paper contributes to the existing studies that analyse the labour market prospects 
of Egypt in view of its demographic changes (see the paper of Jackline Whaba in 
European Commission (2010), Hassan and Sassenpour (2008) and Assaad (2007)). Its 
novelty is that it introduces a small econometric model that distinguishes between the 
public and private sectors’ labour markets that is suitable for simulating the expected 
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future labour supply shocks. In comparison with previous studies, the effects of 
demographic change are analysed in a more complete economic framework that takes 
account of the dynamics of the labour market, distinguishes between the public and 
private sector and incorporates the fiscal balances. By means of this model, I quantify 
the effects of the labour supply for the public and private sector labour markets and 
public finances for the two decades 2011-2030. 
 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background information on 
related studies and presents the main hypotheses that are analysed. Section 3 describes 
the labour market developments in Egypt and compares them with the developments in 
the neighbouring economies of Egypt and other emerging and developed economies. 
Section 4 presents the labour supply model and the results from simulating policy 
scenarios for the future developments of unemployment, the public and private labour 
markets and the public finances in Egypt under different assumptions on labour supply, 
demand shocks and public employment. Section 5 reflects on policy issues. Section 6 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Literature, background and motivation for the model use 
 
The broad pyramid structure of the Egyptian population shows that the inflow in the 
labour force will be high for decades to come. In comparison with other countries, such 
as the G-20, the level of “greening” which measures the population below 15 years in 
relation to the potential labour force in the age category 15 to 65 years, Egypt ranks 
highest. Other countries ranking high are South Africa, but also India (see for instance 
Aiyar and Mody on the Indian situation, 2011)2.  
 
Having an extremely young population, and being numerous, can be a virtue for a 
country from an economic point of view. The rise of an economy’s working-age 
population can give rise to high growth rates, a result known as the “demographic 
dividend”. However, reaping this dividend will only occur in case those entering the 
                                                 
2 Other relevant literature is Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2001) on demographic structure and economic 
growth, Nayab on Pakistan (2007) and Golley and Tyers (2011) on a comparison between China and India. 
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labour force will find a job. Receiving a wage, one can consume or save, and both are 
beneficial for the economy (see for instance Keynes, 1936).  
 
Public sector employment often comprises a major part of the total employment. It is 
larger in emerging countries than in developed economies. Dependent upon its size, 
developments in the public sector can be influential in wage setting and other 
employment practices in the rest of the labour market. The functioning of the public 
sector labour market is thus different from the functioning of the private sector labour 
market. 
 
The recent literature shows a main interest in public sector labour markets. Some 
studies measure and study their composition and size. Although public sector markets 
are large, they do not account for more than 15% of total employment in most 
developed countries (see Gregory and Borland, 2005).  
 
Other studies address public-private wage differentials in developed (Lassibille, 1998) 
and developing countries (Assaad, 1997) to investigate the efficiency of the public sector 
labour markets though the performance of the public sector is difficult to measure 
(Pestieau, 2007). There is a consensus that private sector labour markets are more 
flexible and productive than public sector labour markets. Moreover, public sector 
employment and public sector wages are rather countercyclical (Freeman on the US 
case, 1987).  
 
Generally, the main objection to public sector employment boils down to costliness, in 
that the compensation of government employees imposes on the fiscal budget. This 
applies in particular to Egypt as the public finances are still in a dire state. Egypt’s public 
debt is high at around 70 percent of GDP, and the public deficits have been high even in 
years with a good economic growth performance. Just before the global crisis, the 
Egyptian economy grew with 7% for three years in a row and the fiscal deficit was 
around 7-8% (see Herrera et al., 2010, for a review on recent developments).  
 
Imposing or at least not conducive for the public balance is further the high level of 
unemployment. The unemployment and thus low participation rates, the existence of 
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large informal markets and further discontent and social unrest were among the reasons 
that lead to revolts early 2011 (see also Radwan 2009 on the social impact of the global 
crisis in Egypt). 
 
In discussing the size of the public sector in Egypt, the historical background of Egypt 
plays a role. Egypt is an Arab country, in which the role of the public sector has been big. 
The public sector consists of the general government and civil service where the latter 
includes central and local administration, the armed forces, police and fire services, and 
the provision of social services such as health and education.  
 
Egypt has opted in the past to play a more active and direct role in shaping socio-
economic structures. Development planning emerged as a significant tool of the state in 
performing its functions and responsibilities. I refer here to Said (1996) and Assaad 
(2007) that provide interesting in-depth analyses on the role of the Egyptian public 
sector and the labour market developments in the 1980s and the 1990s. It is in this 
historic respect that one should understand the still quite dominant role of the public 
sector in Egypt. We can keep this in mind, but focus on the future and mainly the near 
past in our following sections.  
 
This paper bases the analyses on an econometric structural labour supply model 
following Tinbergen (see for instance Tinbergen, 1938, or Klein, 1969). Such a model has 
the advantage that it takes account of causalities and dynamics at the labour market and 
other parts of the economy. Not only employment, but also wages and production and 
their segregation into public and private play a role.  
 
Moreover, the model specifies also the fiscal balances that are highly relevant for Egypt 
in view of its high public debt stance. The model is composed of behavioural equations 
and tautological equations where the first are calibrated or econometrically estimated, 
using past statistical information and econometric techniques. This framework offers a 
useful tool to analyse the effects of the additional labour supply on the Egyptian labour 
market due to demographic developments coherently and consistently.  
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Time series for the Egyptian economy, needed for the construction of our databases, are 
meanwhile by and large available for the full decade 2000 to 2010 and on some times 
series even from 1982 onwards and thus sufficiently long. As the literature on 
econometric model and policy making in international and national institutions has been 
showing, the merits of using coherent structural models or careful other statistical 
models generally is more conducive in obtaining adequate policy outcomes than policy 
making without using statistical facts and frameworks. 3 This holds in the more so for 
emerging economies, as Egypt, with its multiple policy challenges and endeavour for 
more transparency at the current juncture. 
 
As econometric modelling is restricted, we further leave aside many features of the 
Egyptian economy that are not irrelevant but beyond the scope of this study. For 
instance, the low participation rates of women and their additional employment costs 
(see Assaad, 2000). Neither do we take into account here the role of remittances for the 
domestic economy (see Binzel and Assaad, 2011). For other features, such as migration, 
relevant in particular to transitioning economies we refer to other literature (see Coale 
and Hoover, 1958). 
 
3. Stylised facts of labour supply and public-private sector employment 
 
The structure of the Egyptian population has the form of a broad pyramid and is 
different from most countries around the globe with 32% of the population below 
fifteen in 2010 (see Figure 1). The large share of the Egyptian population is young. Far 
more than half of the population (61%) was younger than 30 years. The expectation is 
that the pyramid structure will remain at least for the next two decades but, as shown, it 
will get slimmer at the bottom and taller. In 2030, the population below the age of thirty 
is expected to be 11 percentage points lower than in 2010 at 50%. Due to longer 
                                                 
3 For a philosophical discussion about the use of models in economic science and decision-making, see the 
introduction of Sims (1989) or Don (2000). For the building and use of macro-econometric model for 
transitioning economies, see for instance Barrell et al. (2004) or De Haan et al. (2001). For advanced 
modelling techniques for transitioning economies, see Hall et al. (2000).  
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longevity, the expectations are that 2% of the population will reach the age of 75 or 
more, while this was not even 1% in 2010.4  
 
Although Egypt will have more elderly people in the near future, old age dependency 
rates will not go up much due to the strong inflow in the working age population, that 
are people between 15 and 65 years. The structure of Egypt’s population not only stands 
out compared with developed countries, it is also different from other developing 
economies such as India, Indonesia and China and its neighbouring economies.5  
 
 
Figure 1  Age structure of the population of Egypt 
age in years on y-axis, people in persons on x-axis 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), 2011, 
median variant.  
                                                 
4
 The assumption on migration is that it will remain the same. This holds for all variants of the UN POPIN. 
5 In terms of GDP per capita, Egypt is comparable with India, Indonesia and China. In 2010 it ranked just 
higher at 6,367 US dollar GDP per capita in purchasing power parity than India and Indonesia, but just 
lower than China.  
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This follows from figure 2. In comparison with all G20-countries - herewith including 
India, Indonesia and China – Egypt’s youth, dependency rates are highest in the years to 
come (see the upper graph). The expectation is that only South Africa will overtake the 
position of Egypt from 2020 onwards. Compared with the neighbouring North African 
countries, Egypt has even higher youth dependency rates up to the year 2050 (see the 
lower graph). Egypt will thus remain relatively young for decades to come.  
 
Figure 2  Youth dependency rates of Egypt in comparison with other countries 
 
Note: Dependency rates are calculated as the number of people aged from 0 to 14 to those aged 15 to 64.  
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), 2011, 
medium variant.  
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Figure 3  Projected growth rates of the working age population for Egypt 
 
Note: These rates are calculated as the growth rate of the projected number of people between 15 and 64 
in year t in comparison with year t-5.  
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), 2011.  
 
 
The young population is causing a strong inflow in the working age population. While 
the simultaneous outflow of elderly out of the labour force could compensate the inflow, 
this will not be the case for Egypt due to the remaining pyramid age structure. Relatively 
much inflow of young will thus remain for many years to come. The five-year growth 
rates of the working age population will remain above 6% until 2030 (see Figure 3)6.  
Egypt has growth rates that are diminishing over time, a pattern observed in most 
countries worldwide, but still has far higher rates than the other countries with the 
exception of Libya in 2015, 2020 and 2025. Although this demographic pressure on the 
labour market is diminishing over time, the additional labour demand should meet 
additional labour supply for unemployment rates to remain at their current levels. If not, 
they will even go further up. 
 
                                                 
6 The data from the United Nations are on a five-year basis. For this reason the growth rates calculated 
here are not annually, but for each five years, starting in 2010 and ending in 2050 in figure 3.  
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Figure 4  Unemployment and public spending on public employment in Egypt 
 
Sources: Made based on information from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 
(CAPMAS), the official office of statistics in Cairo. The fiscal balance and the fiscal spending on public 
employment come from the Egyptian Ministry of Finance. 
 
Egypt’s current unemployment rate is high. Young entrants at the labour market do not 
easily find a job for that reason. The official unemployment rate was at 10.2% of the 
working age population in fiscal year 2002 (see left graph in Figure 4)7. Unemployment 
even reached 11.2% in 2005, but thereafter decreased to 8.7% in fiscal year 2008 and to 
9.0% in fiscal year 2010 thanks to the prosperous economic growth. Just before the 
economic and financial crisis, in the fiscal years 2006, 2007 and 2008 economic growth 
reached around 7% at annual rates. The global crisis depressed growth to 4-5%. It 
remains puzzling that this hardly affected the unemployment rates. 
 
In addition to the to-be-absorbed large inflows at the labour market and the persistently 
high unemployment rates, there is the dire state of the public finances. The government 
could help financing more projects in order to foster jobs. However, the high fiscal 
deficits (see the left graph in Figure 4) leave not much room to manoeuvre. The fiscal 
debt is high at more than 70% of GDP, consequently interest payments are a main share 
of the government spending. Another substantial share of public spending is the 
compensation of public employment (see Youssef, 2007). 
 
                                                 
7 Some statistics in Egypt, such as on public finances, are provided for fiscal years. Fiscal year 2002 runs 
from July 2001 to June 2002. 
-12,0
-6,0
0,0
6,0
12,0
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
unemployment
(%)
fiscal balance
(% GDP) 20
40
60
80
100
100
200
300
400
500
1999 2004 2009
public wages
(weekly average, 
in Egyptian pounds
left axis)
private wages
(weekly average,
in Egyptian pounds,
left axis)
government spending on public 
employment
(annual, in Egyptian pounds, right axis)
Demographic pressure, excess labour supply and public-private sector employment in Egypt Page 12 
 
The trend in compensation on public employment is steep upwardly sloping (see right 
graph in Figure 4). Even in those years with depressed GDP-growth, in fiscal years 2009 
and 2010, nominal public wages went up by more than 10%. As illustrated by Hassan 
and Sassenpour (2008) for the real private and public wages developments from 1995 
until 20058, it follows also here that the wage developments in both sectors differ a lot 
(Figure 4). Not only the average level of wages has been far lower than in the public 
sector, so were wage increases notably in depression year 2009.  
 
In Egypt 30-40% of all employees (self-employed excluded) are working in the 
government sector. Consequently, not only the price effect of high wages but also the 
quantity effect of a high number of government employees pushes government spending 
upward or at least keeps these at a high level. Around 6 million people were working in 
the government sector during last decade. As the economy has performed well, private 
sector employment grew from 7 million in 1982 to almost 15 million in 2008 (see Figure 
5). Thanks to this growth, the ratio public to private sector employment has been falling 
to around 30% in 2008 (see right axis). This is a good development in itself. It improves 
public finances, as the government spends less money from the public budget on public 
sector employees. We investigate in the next section the extent to which there are 
differences in productivity between the public and the private sector.9  
 
Figure 5  Public and private sector employment in Egypt 
 
Sources: Made based on information from the Ministry of Economic Development in Egypt. 
                                                 
8 Hassan and Sassenpour (2008) used unpublished data from CAPMAS. Wage data used in Figure 4 are 
officially published, indicating that transparency on public and private sector differences has increased. 
9 There is a broad literature in the field of productivity in government services, mainly for developed 
economies. See for instance Fase and Winder (1999). 
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4. A labour supply model for the Egyptian economy 
 
This section specifies a model that describes the relations among macroeconomic 
variables that are relevant to the labour market and the fiscal sector. As we mainly 
analyse the impact of the changes in demographic structure, that is primarily affecting 
labour supply in Egypt, we baptize it the labour supply model. Figure 6 illustrates the 
main flows in the model in a flow chart. In the next sections, we discuss the direct effects 
on unemployment and the indirect effects on wages. We first present the model 
specification, followed by a presentation of the results in four main scenarios. The data 
appendix of this paper describes the database and the technicalities for constructing the 
baseline for the model. 
 
Figure 6  Transmission of a positive labour supply shock 
 
Source: Author.   
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4.i. Labour supply model specification 
 
The labour supply model gives a simplified illustration of the relations among key 
variables at the labour market. In addition, it models the impact of developments at the 
labour market on the real economy and on the flows of public finances. The important 
feature is the segregation of the labour market into two sectors: the public and the 
private.  
 
The model specifies the labour market as follows. Unemployment ( ) is per definition 
specified as excess labour supply as a percentage of labour supply. Denoting labour 
supply as    and labour demand as   , where both are measured in number of persons, 
it then follows that 
 
       
     
  
 
(1) 
 
Labour supply is an exogenous variable in our model. Demographic factors mainly 
determine its size but also behavioural characteristics will in practice matter, such as 
whether or not people of the working age population enter the labour market and 
supply labour. We will focus in our analyses primarily on the demographic supply 
shocks, though one could easily extend the model for other purposes.  
 
Labour demand is endogenous and segregated into public (  
    ) and private sector 
employment (  
    
), as follows 
 
      
       
     
(2) 
 
The government determines the demand for public sector employment, specified here as 
a random walk with a drift ( ) as  
 
  
        
                      
(3) 
 
with subscript -1 referring to the previous year and         being a disturbance term that 
is normally distributed, with zero mean and a constant variance. 
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Whereas economic developments do not affect public sector employment, they affect 
private sector employment. An Error-Correction Model (ECM) specifies labour demand 
in the private sector, dependent upon real gross domestic product (GDP), denoted by  , 
in the long term. Nominal wages in the private sector (     ) deflated by the general 
price index ( ) affect labour demand in the short term. This reads as 
 
       
                      
                                    
     
 
          
(4) 
 
The adjustment parameter   and the long- and short-term parameters, that is the   and 
 , are calibrated and estimated with actual data for the situation of Egypt. The so-called 
“employment elasticity”        , that has received already a lot of attention in previous 
work (see Wahba in European Commission (2010) and Hassan and Sassenpour (2008)), 
will also receive much attention in our analyses here. See the next section.   is again a 
disturbance term with the normality assumptions. Similarly, the subsequent equations 
here below contain such disturbance terms. 
 
As public employment, the setting of public wages is a government decision that is 
independent of market or business cycle developments. Therefore, it is specified here as 
a random walk with a drift (      ) as 
 
         
    +              
(5) 
 
The setting of private wages is much more difficult to specify in a simple equation. It 
depends on many different factors. In market economies, private sector wages generally 
depend on the consumer price inflation, productivity growth and unemployment. The 
higher the inflation, the higher the productivity or the lower the unemployment rate, the 
more power employees have to negotiate a high wage rate. The labour market in the 
Egyptian economy is however not yet functioning according to market principles. 
Especially the high unemployment rate has kept the private wage level extremely low. 
We therefore assume wages in our analyses to follow a random walk with a drift as  
 
         
    +              
(6) 
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Nevertheless, we experiment also with a more elaborate wage equation in our analyses 
(see the other scenarios in section 4.v). 
 
The model specifies the real side of the economy from a supply side approach. Real GDP 
in the public sector, that is government services and products, depends on public sector 
employment: 
 
                      
            
(7) 
 
Private sector employment produces the services and products in the private sector, so 
it determines real GDP of the private sector. We follow other macro-econometric model 
studies (see Barrell et al. (2004) or Demertzis et al. (2007)) and specify a long run 
relationship: 
 
                       
             
             
(8) 
 
Total nominal GDP equals nominal public sector GDP in addition to nominal private 
sector GDP. As only one price-level holds this boils down to: 
 
                
(9) 
 
We define the welfare (WF) as, 
 
    
   
   
 
(10) 
which defines nominal GDP, that equals p*y, divided by the total population POP. This 
welfare measure is thus GDP per capita. 
 
Developments at the labour market and real side of the economy feed into the public 
finances. Government total taxes ( ) consist of profit taxes (       ), income taxes 
(       ) and other taxes (      ): 
 
                          
(11) 
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Profit taxes are earned by taxing the profits of the private sector, that is the revenues 
(       ) after the payment of the employees’ salaries (           ). Denoting the tax 
rate on income as (       ), it follows that 
 
                                   
(12) 
 
The taxation of the total incomes of employees in the public and private sector 
determines the income taxes of the government, specified as 
 
                                          
(13) 
 
where                                        
 
A main share of the government spending is the spending on government employees, 
that is the average nominal public sector wage times the number of employees, 
           . The model further incorporates that the government also can pay a 
benefit to people that are unemployed. The total government spending on unemployed 
equals the average benefit denoted as      times the number of unemployed persons, 
which equals        Apart from government wages and unemployment benefits there 
exist other government expenditures (      ). The specification for total government 
spending ( ) is thus 
 
                                   
(14) 
 
Finally, the government balance as a percentage of nominal GDP (   ) follow as the 
government expenditures deducted from the total taxes as a share of GDP:  
 
         
   
    
 
(15) 
 
In sum, this model has fifteen equations and consequently fifteen endogenous variables. 
The appendix gives the full list of endogenous as well as exogenous variables.  
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4.ii. Calibrated and estimated elasticities and other parameters 
 
With the labour supply model as specified by the equations (1)-(15), we perform several 
scenarios that are described in the following subsections. The annual time series used 
for Egypt cover the period 1982-2010 (see also their illustration in the Figures 1-5). The 
data appendix describes the details.  
 
The parameters in the labour demand (4) and wage equation for the private sector (5), 
as well as the production equations (7)-(8) are estimated simultaneously by ordinary 
least squares. Some argue that the employment elasticity        , that defines the change 
of labour demand in response to a percentage change in private production, should 
equal the production elasticity of labour that is                   (see for instance 
Hassan and Sassenpour, 2008). We test for this restriction, but it does not hold. Our 
estimate for the employment elasticity is 0.92 and highly significant (see table 1). This 
relatively high elasticity indicates that production in the private sector is labour-
intensive. As we take into account the private sector only, instead of the whole economy 
used in previous studies, the results indicate that productivity in the private sector is 
high.10 Interestingly, also real wages are significant in the labour demand equation for 
the private sector. We calibrate the elasticity in the private production function at 1.00, 
as the estimated parameter exceeds 1.00 and is highly significant. This indicates that a 
one percent increase in labour leads to a one percent increase in production in the long 
run in our model. . 
 
Table 1  Estimated and calibrated parameters of the labour supply model 
Labour demand private sector 
(equation 4) 
Production private sector 
(equation 8) 
Public finances 
             
(-) 
            
(-) 
            
             
(52.6) 
         
(-) 
            
        -0.05 
(-3.6) 
            20 
   
   
                   0.30  
Source: Own estimations and calibrations. 
Note: Values in brackets are Student t-values where a bar, -, implies that the parameter is calibrated. 
 
                                                 
10 For earlier samples, the estimate by Hassan and Sassenpour for Egypt was 0.59; while Whaba uses in 
her analyses 0.68 for Egypt (see European Commission, 2010). 
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The public production equation (7) does not deliver sensible estimates. The historically 
large government sector of Egypt produces goods and services, but labour demand in 
the public sector is unrelated to production growth. For this reason public production 
follows also a random walk (so         ). This is in line with macro-econometric 
models for developed economies (see Demertzis et al., 2006).  
 
Table 1 also lists the calibrated values for the tax rates (see last column). Officially, Egypt 
does not have unemployment benefits but we expect social policy to improve as the 
country develops further. Here, we assume that there is compensation for unemployed 
people (see same column) that follows the developments in the private sector wages, 
divided by 20. This boils down to about 100 euro in 2010. Although this is somehow 
arbitrary, it is indicative, as we should evidently assume that public spending rises in 
line with unemployment. Unemployment benefits should follow market wage 
developments and for an emerging economy as Egypt, the benefit assumption made 
seems on the low rather than on the high side. Be it not direct spending on a benefit, 
than be it spending on unemployment schooling schemes, or support for food. 
Calculations for a share of this public spending, for instance, can be carried out 
straightforwardly as the model is linear. 
 
The scenarios described in the following subsections use these values. However, we use 
also other values in the scenarios of our sensitivity analyses to test the impact of the 
estimated and calibrated parameters in this paper (see Table 2)  
 
The constructed baseline covers the years 2011-2030. It contains naïve forecasts for the 
period 2011-2030, implying that we keep the values of the variables at their levels in 
2010. The baseline as such is irrelevant to the outcomes of the analyses as the model is 
linear and our interest concerns the deviations from the baseline (in percentages or 
percentage points).The labour supply shock, as described in scenario A is our starting 
point (see subsection 4.iii). The subsequent scenarios presents the results as deviations 
from the baseline along with scenario A in order to illustrate to what extent the effects of 
the labour supply shock can be counteracted under the assumptions that have been 
made.  
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4.iii. Scenario A – The impact of positive labour supply shocks in 2011-2030 
 
For each of the years 2011 until 2020 we simulate a labour supply shock of 1.75%, 
which means in practice that labour demand grows at 1.75% at an annual rate, 
corresponding with the expected increases in the working age population as projected 
by the United Nations for this period (see Figure 3)11 12. As follows from figure 7, this 
additional labour supply leads to an increase of 10 million unemployed persons in 2020 
and 20 million in 2030 in comparison with the baseline, which equals half a million jobs 
per year. It entails a tripling of the current unemployment rate from 9% in 2010 to 30% 
in 2030. The real side of the economy does not change, as the additional supply does not 
create additional demand and neither does it offer a positive impetus for the production 
process, as the newly entered persons at the labour market do not (yet) participate in 
the production process. Assuming that each unemployed person receives compensation 
from the government, the government balance will deteriorate in comparison from the 
baseline, as there are more people unemployed than in the baseline. In this case the 
fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP will be 0.8%-point lower than in the baseline in 
2030 (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 Simulation effects in response to supply shocks of 1.75% in 2011-30 
 
Source : Own calculations on the basis of the econometric labour supply model as specified in section 4.i. 
                                                 
11 See the data appendix for more information on the size of the shock. 
12 This shock size is lower than used in previous studies (Hassan and Sassenpour (2008) take 2.9%). 
Wahba (see European Commission, 2010) even assumes that total employment will rise by 3.5% annually 
and that the unemployment rate will remain constant, which results in projections of 715.000 jobs to be 
created annually in 2006-20. In view of Hassan and Sassenpour’s and Wahba’s analyses, our labour supply 
shock scenario is thus more prudent. 
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4.iv. Scenario B – The impact of sustained positive demand shocks in 2011-20 
 
For each of the years 2011 until 2020 we simulate that there is a labour supply shock, as 
illustrated in scenario A, and in addition a positive demand shock of 5% of the GDP 
growth (year-on-year) in the period 2011-2020. The size of these shocks is slightly 
lower than the economic growth of around 7% that Egypt recorded in the fiscal years up 
to the global crisis, namely in 2005-07, but it is higher than Egypt’s performance average 
over the last two decades. Moreover, this shock is representing a demand shock that 
could originate from for instance high export growth (due to higher foreign demand) or 
high domestic investment (higher inward foreign direct investment). The demand shock 
gives rise to more demand for labour in the private sector (equation 3), and this higher 
employment in return pushes up GDP. The demand shock compensates for the labour 
supply shock in terms of unemployment and the latter falls even slightly below the 
baseline scenario in 2020. Due to the high demand, the private sector creates more than 
5 million jobs. The fiscal balance improves as GDP is higher, being the denominator 
effect. Moreover, the profit taxes as well as labour income taxes rise. In sum, this 
scenario therefore gives a much brighter picture of the developments of unemployment, 
the fiscal balance, and the welfare effect. Figure 11 illustrates the simulated welfare 
effect for different demand shocks of 3, 5 and 7%. 
 
Figure 8 Simulation effects in response to positive demand shocks in 2011-20 
 
Source : Own calculations on the basis of the econometric labour supply model as specified in section 4.i. 
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4.v.Other scenarios 
 
Many other scenarios could be analysed by using this labour supply model. We here 
below only sketch two.  
 
In the first scenario, the government will reform the government sector and privatise 
some public enterprises. We assume that the privatisation process does not lead to 
forced dismissals during the first ten years. For each of the years 2011 until 2020 
100,000 public employees become employees in the private sector. From 2021 to 2030, 
the government continues shedding labour, by 100,000 employees per year. 
Consequently, the government will employ two million people less after these two 
decades and the private sector will employ one million former public sector employees 
after the first decade.  
 
Figure 9 Simulation effects in response to decreases in public employment in 2011-30 
 
Source : Own calculations on the basis of the econometric labour supply model as specified in section 4.i. 
 
In this scenario, unemployment hardly changes between 2011-2020 as there is only a 
shift of employees from the public to the private sector. Also, the one million public 
employees shed by the government during 2021-2030 can find a job in the private 
sector thanks to the newly created jobs out of the higher economic activity. 
Unemployment falls for some years in a row by about 400,000 persons in deviation from 
the baseline. The fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP improves significantly, as the 
private sector pays the wage bill of the two million former public sector employees. The 
increase in the balance goes up to 6%-points in deviation from the baseline in 2030. In 
the combined scenario of a privatisation and the labour supply shock, the fiscal balance 
improves less due to the higher number of unemployed persons.  
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In a second scenario, we assume that private wages are determined in the market sector 
according to market performance by means of a long-term relationship between the real 
wage (        , production per employee in the private sector (             and the 
unemployment rate. We therefore replace equation (6) by equation (6-alt) that you find 
here. Attempts to estimate the wage equation for Egypt for the period 2000-2010 does 
not deliver economically sensible parameter estimates, which gives us the information 
that private sector wages did not react to productivity and unemployment during the 
sample period used for estimation. Instead, we calibrate the parameter at the values for 
the wage equation of Eastern European countries from Barrell et al. (2004) and reads as 
 
     
     
 
                
             
   
    
   
    
         
(6-alt) 
We consider this hypothetical market rule as a “desired” relationship, in which wages 
react to changes in productivity and unemployment. Simulating again the 1.75% labour 
supply shock resulting from demographic developments and unemployment rises, 
wages temporarily decrease in reaction to the higher unemployment. In return, this 
triggers a rise in labour demand in the private sector (equation (4)). Figure 10 
illustrates the effects of the number of employees in the private sector in comparison 
with those of the labour supply shock scenario. It follows that he private sector creates 
half a percent more jobs and public finances improve by 1% of GDP in case the wage 
mechanism is at work. Therefore, although wages fall, the long-run results are more 
beneficial for the whole economy. 
 
Figure 10 Simulation effects of market wages reacting to unemployment and productivity 
 
Source : Own calculations on the basis of the econometric labour supply model as specified in section 4.i. 
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4.vi. Sensitivity analyses with varying assumptions and shock sizes 
 
As the responses to the shocks depend of course to a certain extent on the underlying 
assumptions and parameter estimates, this subsection presents the results of sensitivity 
analyses. Table 2 presents the responses to the labour supply as well as the demand 
shock scenarios for supply size shocks of 0.75% and 2.75%, labour demand shocks of 3, 
5 and 7%, employment elasticities of 0.75 and 0.50, and profit and income tax rates of 
10%, 20% and 30%, each for the year 2020 and 2030.  
 
Table 2  Simulation effects under varying assumptions and shock sizes 
in percentage points deviation from the baseline 
Shock size or  
parameter value 
Year Labour supply shock Demand shock 
  U GFB U GFB 
      
Labour supply shock 0.75% 2020 1.9  -0.1   
Labour supply shock 0.75% 2030 3.9  -0.3   
Labour supply shock 1.75% 2020 4.6 -0.3   
Labour supply shock 1.75% 2030 10.0 -0.7   
Labour supply shock 2.75% 2020 7.5 -0.6   
Labour supply shock 2.75% 2030 17.4 -1.3   
Demand shock 3% 2020   -3.0 3.6 
Demand shock 3% 2030   -4.1 4.0 
Demand shock 5% 2020   -5.3 5.6 
Demand shock 5% 2030   -7.4 6.2 
Demand shock 7% 2020   -7.8 7.2 
Demand shock 7% 2030   -11.2 7.9 
       = 0.92 2020 4.6 -0.3 -5.3 5.6 
       = 0.92 2030 10.0 -0.7 -7.4 6.2 
       = 0.75 2020 4.6 -0.3 -3.9 5.0 
       = 0.75 2030 10.0 -0.7 -4.8 4.8 
       = 0.50 2020 4.6 -0.3 -2.3 4.3 
       = 0.50 2030 10.0 -0.7 -2.5 3.4 
            2020 4.6 -0.3 -5.3 5.6 
         0.2 2030 10.0 -0.7 -7.4 6.2 
       = 0.3 2020 4.6 -0.3 -5.3 9.4 
         0.3 2030 10.0 -0.7 -7.4 9.9 
         0.1 2020 4.6 -0.3 -5.3 5.6 
         0.1 2030 10.0 -0.7 -7.4 6.2 
         0.2 2020 4.6 -0.3 -5.3 8.6 
        = 0.2 2030 10.0 -0.7 -7.4 9.3 
      
Source: Own calculations based on the econometric labour supply model, see subsection 4.i.  
Note: The responses of the demand shock and the labour supply shock, simultaneously, follow by adding 
the effects of both scenarios. 
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The speed of job creation in the private sector is crucial. As private sector productivity is 
high (see equation (8)), each newly created job translates in additional production that 
can in return need to new job creation. This follows from Table 2, where the 
employment elasticity         is most relevant in this context. In our scenarios as 
presented in the previous sections, this elasticity is high at 0.92, assuming that a 1% rise 
in GDP increases private sector employment 0.92%. The results in Table 2 show that in 
case of a sustained demand shock of 5% in each year of the period 2011-2020, 
unemployment will decrease 3.9 million people instead of 5.3 million in case the 
employment elasticity is 0.75 instead of 0.92, ceteris paribus. This is thus a difference of 
1.4 million people, only due to the difference in employment elasticity. We recall that the 
employment elasticity was empirically confirmed to have the high size with a high t-
value (see Table 1), for which reason the estimate of 0.92 is the most likely outcome. It 
reflects the rapidly emerging labour market developments in Egypt. 
 
Finally, Figure 11 illustrates that the development of welfare levels vary significantly 
under different assumptions of the economic growth rate. 
 
Figure 11  Simulated effects of GDP per capita at different GDP growth rates 
in domestic currency, indexed at 2000=100 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the econometric labour supply model. 
Note: This contains actual figures until and including 2010 and population growth projections for 2011-
2030 according to the UN. See scenario B and Table 2 for the GDP growth assumptions. 
100
300
500
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
7%
3%
5%
Demographic pressure, excess labour supply and public-private sector employment in Egypt Page 26 
 
5. Policy reflections 
The simulation results in the previous section show that Egypt faces a tripling of its 
current unemployment rate over the two decades 2011-2030 in case the economy 
would stop growing. This is under the assumption that the size of labour supply grows 
at 1.75% each year, in line with the demographic developments as projected by the 
United Nations for the working age population of people between 15 and 65. The 
increase in unemployed people will be 500,000 each year, or 10 million during the 20-
year time span. In making these calculations, we remain on the prudent side. Labour 
supply can increase faster, due to the active participation of groups of people (for 
instance women and workers in the informal sector). For the sake of quantifying the 
effects, let us stick to the assumption that labour supply growth will (only) be 1.75%. 
 
Then, different policy actions can anticipate these big supply shocks. For instance, a 
sustained economic growth of 5% would create around 300,000 to 500,000 jobs each 
year. This would suffice to absorb the new entrants at the labour market. The additional 
labour supply would in this case not lead to excess unemployment in comparison with 
the baseline. In view of Egypt’s economic performance in historical perspective, an 
economic growth at 5% does not seem infeasible, although keeping this growth 
performance for a long period may be difficult. This holds even for an emerging 
economy as Egypt as no recessionary years should occur. As half a million young people 
will enter the labour market each year during 2011-2030, as follows from the analyses, 
economic growth will have to remain at high positive levels for the decade 2021-2030 
even if economic growth is high at 5% during the first ten years (2011-2020).  
 
There are several ways to stimulate economic growth. For instance, the government can 
gear its policy and measures towards attracting more foreign direct investment.  
 
Our findings further show that productivity in Egypt’s private sector if higher than 
productivity in the public sector. It is because of this higher productivity that new jobs 
better be created in the private instead of in the public sector. Job creation in the private 
sector increase production rapidly and this in turn can trigger new jobs creation. 
Moreover, private sector developments are far more beneficial for public finances. The 
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public sector receives more taxes in the form of profit and income taxes and the outlays 
on the compensation of the new employees do not impose on the public budget. 
 
A possible venue is also to privatising public enterprises. This would improve directly 
the public balances and increase efficiency and productivity in case the shed public 
employees find a job in the private sector. Taking policy measures to privatise public 
enterprises seems therefore, at least to some extent, a viable way to counteract the 
labour supply shock effects that the Egyptian economy is undergoing. The situation can 
even improve further in case market mechanisms start functioning better. The rises in 
public wages by 10 to 30% in the years 2007-09 deteriorated the fiscal balance and 
widened the gap with the market wage developments. A further widening of the gap 
does not seem justifiable. Incentives are to be placed to make job creation and working 
in the private sector attractive, as it will catalyze economic activity and therewith open 
new jobs that the Egyptian economy needs for absorbing the new entrants at the labour 
market. Egypt can reap the demographic growth dividend by the boost in production 
due to the young and numerous labour forces once the private sector starts to function 
better and price and wage mechanisms are at work. Although wage setting in the private 
sector is evidently not a task for the government, the latter should support its working 
according to market principles. 13 
 
The labour market prospects that Egypt faces are not unique. Other countries, among 
them many Arab countries, also foresee big increases in labour supply in the short to 
medium term. In combination with the current loose domestic labour markets, and only 
scarce labour market opportunities in the neighbourhood (such as in the Gulf 
peninsula), job creation in the private sector should be priority number one on their 
policy agenda. Although public sector jobs are highly relevant (teachers, health care), 
public sector employment, in abroad sense, should become more efficient. In 
comparison with other countries, a further growth in comparison with the private sector 
employment should not occur. Anyhow, developments in the public sector ought not to 
hamper private sector job creation.  
                                                 
13 The revolution early 2011 changed the situation in Egypt, but the 6th Five-year plan 2007-2012 (see 
Ministry of Planning, website) stated that employment rises by 3.5% each year and that unemployment 
will decrease to 5.5% in 2012/11 (see chapter 6, page 140 and 144). It does not distinguish between 
private and public processes. 
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6. Summary, conclusions and future research suggestions 
 
This study simulates the future development of the labour market supply in Egypt 
according to long-term prospects for Egypt of the United Nations. In addition to other 
studies, it specifies and estimates a labour supply model with actual publicly available 
time series on the Egyptian economy that is useful for performing a wide range of 
scenarios. It not only takes into account unemployment and employment developments, 
but it also models wages as well as the real and fiscal side of the Egyptian economy. 
 
Moreover, as a special feature, the labour supply model segregates the economy into the 
private and public sector. This is especially for Egypt highly relevant. The Egyptian 
economy still has a large public sector that employs 30-40% of the total employment. 
The compensation for employees is a big share of the government expenditures, while 
the public debt and deficit are still persistently high.  
 
Labour demand by the public sector is a policy variable, as the government decides on it. 
It is therefore exogenous. The same holds for government wages. This implies, for 
instance, that a reduction in economic activity is not felt in the government sector. Wage 
setting in the private sector can be simulated, according to market principles. This offers 
the opportunity to study the impact of recessions or booms on the price mechanism of 
the labour market and the fiscal position. 
 
This study shows the benefits of creating jobs in the private and not the public sector. 
Not only public finance will be far better off in case this would happen, but also the 
labour market can start functioning better with lower or non-increasing unemployment 
in comparison with the current stance (9% in 2010). Egypt is thus not a Lewis type 
economy with infinite supply where wages will only start rising after the demographic 
growth starts diminishing (see Lewis, 1954).  
 
Other important empirical results follow from the labour demand equation. The 
employment elasticity, that reflects the change in labour demand in response to a 
change in real GDP, is estimated and found to be high at 0.92 and significant for the 
sample 2000-2008. In reaction to a positive shock in production, the demand for labour 
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in the private sector is thus relatively high. As the public sector shows no relation 
between labour demand and production, and vice versa, it is the private sector where 
jobs are created and where productivity is high.  
 
According to our findings, a steady economic growth rate of 5% during the next decade 
will help the Egyptian economy in its endeavour to create jobs in the private sector at a 
pace of 500.000 per year. In this scenario, the new entrants at its domestic labour 
market, originating from the demographic pyramid structure, at these high growth rates 
are helped in that they will even be able to find a job in the short-term. The growth 
dividend from the demographic structural change will is this case be fully reaped. 
 
The labour supply model is easy to use and could be used for analysing more detailed 
developments of the Egyptian economy. Over time, when longer time series exist, the 
behavioural equations can be re-estimated. In view of the rapid developments, 
parameter estimates will change, but tests on structural breaks will become feasible and 
statistically founded due to the larger sample sizes.The fact that Egypt is an emerging 
economy, with still relatively short data series at this stage, is not hampering our 
analyses. This labour supply model is an analytical tool for Egypt, as so many tools are 
around for economies at similar development degrees as Egypt across the globe. Its 
usefulness in fact also lies in the construction of its database. Consistency in statistics, in 
time and among the different delivering public institutions is of utmost importance to 
reach reliable estimates for the behavioural equations. In the current situation, there is 
already ample information, but consistency and transparency about the construction of 
the statistical information can be improved. This is indispensable for analysing recent 
and ongoing development and for preparing the inputs for policy recommendations. 
 
The emerging state of the Egyptian economy, exceeding potentially the growth of many 
countries across the globe, justifies further in-depth future research based on more facts 
and thorough analyses. Studies on productivity measures at the macro and micro level, 
along with labour market information on employment and wages on a disaggregate 
level, would be very welcome to shed more light on the actual functioning of the labour 
market.   
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Appendix on data sources and variables used in the analyses 
 
The time series used in the labour supply model all originate from public Egyptian 
sources. The figures presented in section 3 on public and private sector employment and 
nominal GDP for the public and private sector come from the Ministry of Economic 
Development. The public and private wages, the unemployment rate and real GDP come 
from the official office of statistics Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 
(CAPMAS) and the fiscal variables originate from the Egyptian Ministry of Finance.  
 
In order to keep consistency within the framework of the model, I derived some 
variables from others. For instance, I derived labour supply via the unemployment 
identity (see equation 1) from the unemployment rate and the total employment, which 
equals the employment in the public and private sector (equation 2). However, some 
inconsistencies among data sources remain. An example is the government expenditures 
on the compensation of employees. According to my calculations on the basis of data on 
the average weekly public wage times series (from CAPMAS) and the government 
employees (from the Ministry of Economic Development), the compensation of 
employees accounts for roughly 45% of the total government expenditures (that come 
from the Ministry of Finance) in the years 2000-2008. This does not correspond with the 
compensation of employees of 25% that the Ministry of Finance provides. 
 
For the years 2000-2010 all time series are available, apart from public and private 
employment in 2009 and 2010 and public and private wages in 2010. I forecast these 
data points using univariate autoregressive regressions estimated by means of Ordinary 
Least Squares. In this way, the database for the period 2000-2010 was completed. 
Thereafter, I constructed a baseline by naive forecasting. That is, I extrapolated all level 
variables by keeping them constant at the values of 2010 for the whole projection period 
2011-2030 with keeping the drifts at zero (see equations (3), (5)-(6)). Please notice that 
the baseline as such is not relevant to the results presented, as the model is linear and 
we concentrate on deviations from the basis throughout the analyses. 
 
I determined the size of the labour supply shocks by interpolating linearly the working-
age-population (people between 15 and 65) projections for Egypt of the five-year 
cohorts for 2010 until 2030 and calculated the annual growth rates. The average annual 
rate of the working age population is precisely 1.75%. I used this rate throughout the 
scenario analyses for projecting labour supply growth, as it seems the most likely 
outcome. By using the projection of the working age population growth for projecting 
the labour supply growth, I maintain the assumption that there are over time no 
proportional changes in the number of students, chronically ill people, migrants, or 
others between the age of 15 and 65. 
 
 
All statistical information and programmes used in this paper are available upon request. 
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The full list of endogenous variables in this paper reads in alphabetical order along with 
their name and unity of measurement as follows: 
 
 
 = government spending, in million Egyptian pounds 
   =fiscal balance, as a percentage of nominal GDP 
   = total employment, in million persons 
  
    
= employment in the government sector, in million persons 
  
    
= employment in the public sector, in million persons 
 =total taxes, in million Egyptian pounds 
       =taxes on income, in million Egyptian pounds 
       = taxes on profits, in million Egyptian pounds 
 =unemployment, as a percentage 
     = average wage per public sector employee, in Egyptian pounds  
     = average wage per public sector employee, in Egyptian pounds  
WF=welfare, measured as GDP per capita in Egyptian pounds 
 = GDP in values, in million Egyptian pounds 
     = GDP of the private sector in volumes, in million Egyptian pounds 
     = GDP of the public sector in volumes, in million Egyptian pounds 
 
In addition, there are the following exogenous variables: 
 
      = government spending, in million Egyptian pounds 
   = labour supply, in million persons 
P=price index - representing producer as well as consumer prices 
POP=total population, in million persons 
       =income tax rate 
       =profit tax rate 
      =other taxes than profit and income taxes, in million Egyptian pounds 
    =average unemployment benefit per unemployed person, in Egyptian pounds 
